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INTRODUCTION
America is currently facing an imminent disaster which the vast ma-
jority of its citizens are entirely unaware of. This disaster has nothing to
do with militant terrorist organizations. It does not involve an impending
worldwide shortage of fossil fuels, or the potential development of nu-
* J.D., University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; B.S., with honors, University of
Utah. I would like to thank my father, Richard S. Krannich, for his assistance with this Article
and for his many important influences, which go too often unacknowledged. I would be sur-
prised if he does not sometimes wonder how the son of a sociologist who has spent his life
studying the effects of development and growth on American communities became a lawyer
who practices corporate litigation. This Article may answer that question, at least in part, for
the foundation of this Article is my conviction that seemingly incongruous interests can be
balanced in pursuit of the greater good of this nation as well as my faith in the ability (if not
always the desire) of our government to do so. May I have one-tenth the impact in my chosen
field as my father has had in his; if so, I will consider my career a resounding success.
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clear weapons in hostile nations. No, this disaster looms much closer to
home: America is presently facing an impending shortage of productive
agricultural land. For many years, governments at every level have al-
lowed unplanned, rapid-fire, speculative development to occur virtually
unrestrained in every region of this country. This development is occur-
ring almost exclusively on productive agricultural land. The result:
America's most productive agricultural land is quickly being replaced
with strip malls, apartment complexes, and shopping centers; in other
words, suburban sprawl. This widespread conversion of agricultural land
is pervasive, and it is a disaster that is swiftly reaching a crescendo.
The citizens of this nation are currently experiencing a very differ-
ent state of affairs than our forefathers were accustomed to. At the time
of this country's founding, Thomas Jefferson envisioned America as a
nation built of small communities, each organized around subsistence
farming. Agriculture was to be the cornerstone of the nation's economy.
Jefferson's vision is quite obviously archaic in comparison to modern
corporate America. Yet, most contemporary Americans would likely
scoff at the notion that the country is now facing an imminent shortage of
agricultural land. However, this is the situation the nation now faces. At
current rates, all of America's productive agricultural land will be gone
in a little over two hundred years. The agricultural land of this country
has quite literally become endangered.
Moreover, the rate at which this nation's productive agricultural
land is developed and converted to other uses continues to increase, due
to a wide variety of factors. Much of America's most productive agricul-
tural land is located in immediate proximity to urban areas. Thus, as
urban areas continue their natural expansion, this prime agricultural land
is situated directly in the path of encroaching development. In addition,
the market for development has operated for years in such a way that the
long term consequences of land conversion are not properly accounted
for. This is because the demand for development continues to escalate at
a rate that exceeds the ability of localities to plan for the resulting
growth. Rather than adjust their land use planning schemes to effectively
balance competing interests, the majority of states have simply allowed
the market to dictate the pace and manner of development. Expansion
thus occurs in an unplanned, scattered fashion, and productive agricul-
tural land is frequently replaced with suburban sprawl. Governments on
both a national and state level have long been aware of this phenomenon,
yet have not come close to reaching a solution to it. Sprawl and agglom-
eration threaten to devour the most productive agricultural land in
America, and as of today there exists no settled strategy to stem the tide.
Yet, this is not a problem that is inherently incapable of solution.
The federal government and state and local governments possess all of
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the powers and land use planning tools necessary to accomplish the task,
but have not fashioned a proper remedy. The answer lies in organization
and implementation. The efforts of governments at all levels must be
coordinated to assist in the development and implementation of a com-
prehensive land use planning model. The rapid nationwide conversion of
prime agricultural land can only be effectively managed by a comprehen-
sive land use planning model that is flexible enough to allow develop-
ment and preservation to complement one another, and also sufficiently
elastic that it can be adapted to suit the unique needs of each state. While
productive agricultural land is being converted to suburban sprawl in
every state, no single scheme is capable of uniformly solving the prob-
lem. Rather, states need a model that can be altered as needed to account
for the differences amongst localities while still reaching the same end
result. Thus, the goal of this Article is to lay the groundwork for the
development of a model that incorporates various land use planning tools
in a way that will allow localities to properly balance competing interests
to ensure that development occurs in an intelligent, well-planned manner.
Part II of this Article provides detailed statistical evidence showing
that productive agricultural land is being developed and converted to
suburban sprawl in every state and locality in America. Part I1 also dem-
onstrates that, because of market pressures and the general location of
America's most productive agricultural land, the rate at which agricul-
tural land is being developed and converted to other uses continues to
escalate. In addition, Part II provides an account of the problems result-
ing from this phenomenon, as well as a description of the benefits of
agricultural land, economic and otherwise. Part III discusses land use
planning programs implemented by federal, state, and local governments,
concluding that the measures currently being utilized are insufficient to
adequately balance the competing interests of development and agricul-
tural land preservation. Part IV considers the legal implications of a
comprehensive land use planning model, with particular emphasis placed
on Fifth Amendment "takings" challenges to the implementation of land
use restrictions such as agricultural zoning. Finally, Part V provides sug-
gestions for the development of a comprehensive land use planning
model. Part V proposes a framework to coordinate the respective efforts
and capabilities of the federal government, state governments, local gov-
ernments, and even private organizations to assist with the implementa-
tion of a land use planning scheme designed to preserve America's
productive and valuable agricultural land while ensuring that develop-
ment proceeds in an intelligent fashion. In addition to suggesting a
framework for governmental organization, Part V provides a detailed ex-
ample of the manner in which various land use planning tools can be
deployed as part of a comprehensive land use planning scheme that can
2006]
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be adapted to account for differences among states and localities while
achieving uniform results.
I. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRODUCTIVE AGRICULTURAL LAND AND
SUBURBAN SPRAWL
Urban expansion is irrevocably changing the landscape of America.
While the migration of America's populace to urban areas-and the
growth of urban areas-has been a dominant social trend for decades, the
rate of urbanization has increased dramatically in recent years. Between
1982 and 1997 the population of the United States grew by seventeen
percent, but the amount of urbanized land in America increased by forty-
seven percent. ' Current estimates place the amount of land being devel-
oped in America each year at two million acres.2 Most of this land is
productive agricultural land; conservative estimates place the amount of
productive agricultural land developed each year at approximately one
million acres. 3 Currently, two acres of productive agricultural land are
developed and converted to other uses each minute.4 At this rate, all of
the agricultural land in America will be exhausted by the year 2225. 5
However, this land will likely be lost much sooner because the rate at
which agricultural land is being developed and converted to other uses
continues to increase. Agricultural land was developed fifty-one percent
faster during the 1990s than during the 1980s. 6 The highest rate of loss
is attributable to the most productive land; the rate of conversion for
prime agricultural land between 1992 and 1997 was thirty percent higher
than for non-prime agricultural land.7 Moreover, this escalation is un-
likely to slow because the majority of America's most productive farm-
land is directly in the path of development. Eighty-six percent of the
I See American Farmland Trust, Farming on the Edge Report, at http://www.farmland.
org/resources/fote/default.asp [hereinafter Major National Findings] (discussing population
growth in relation to urbanization). Between 1945 and 2002 the amount of urbanized land in
America quadrupled, from fifteen million acres to fifty-nine million acres, while the total pop-
ulation of the country only doubled. RUBEN LUBOWSKI, MARLOW VESTERBY, & SHAWN
BUCHOLTz, LAND USE, at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/arei/eib16/eibl6_1 - ! .pdf.
2 David C. Levy & Rachael P. Melliar-Smith, The Race for the Future: Farmland Pres-
ervation Tools, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 15 (2003).
3 See David L. Szlanfucht, How to Save America 's Depleting Supply of Farmland, 4
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333, 336 (1999). However, some studies have found the average annual
loss of agricultural land to other uses to be much higher. For example, Luther Tweeten esti-
mates that agricultural land in America is converted to other uses at a rate of four million acres
annually. Luther Tweeten, Food Security and Farmland Preservation, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
237, 240 (1998) (discussing average annual loss of agricultural land between 1945 and 1992).
4 Major National Findings, supra note 1.
5 See Tweeten, supra note 3, at 240.




fruits and vegetables and sixty-three percent of the dairy products pro-
duced in the United States are produced on agricultural land located im-
mediately contiguous to urban areas. 8 "In fact, fewer than one-fifth of
rural counties in North America now have a significant economic depen-
dence on farming[.]" 9 Therefore, the majority of America's prime agri-
cultural land is perfectly situated for development. As urban areas
expand, America's most productive agricultural land will continue to be
converted to other uses.
Moreover, the rate at which agricultural land in areas adjacent to
urban centers is developed will continue to increase as a function of the
market. Many American consumers desire to build homes on large lots,
which are often unavailable (at least at an affordable price) in metropoli-
tan areas.' 0 In addition, "the high cost of housing in major cities and
coastal environments" drives many people to search for homes in outly-
ing areas." Therefore, consumers create an escalating demand for the
development of land contiguous to urban areas.' 2 Because America's
most productive agricultural land is located near urban areas, this land
provides the supply. Therefore, developers naturally focus on the pro-
ductive agricultural land surrounding America's urban centers as they
respond to consumer demand. Developers also have a more basic reason
to develop and convert agricultural land to other uses: farmland is partic-
ularly attractive because it is flat and well-drained, and therefore easily
converted to commercial, industrial, or residential purposes.' 3 As Chi-
8 Id.
9 John W. Keller, The Importance of Rural Development in the 21st Century - Persis-
tence, Sustainability, and Futures, at http://www.regional.org.au/au/countrytowns/keynote/kel-
ler.htm (citing Deavers, What is Rural? Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 20, Issue 2, at 184-89
(1992)).
10 See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Agricultural Zoning: Impacts and Future Directions, 22 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 419, 441 (2002) (noting that suburban sprawl exists because it "is what a
significant number of consumers want"); Major National Findings, supra note I ("[S]ince
1994, 10+ acre housing lots have accounted for 55 percent of the land developed.").
I I Levy & Melliar-Smith, supra note 2, at 15.
12 There are many other factors that contribute to consumers' demand for the develop-
ment of agricultural land. For example, telecommunications have had an increasing impact in
recent years. Developments in telecommunications are "releasing households from location
constraints related to maximum acceptable time and distance." Keller, supra note 9. Because
people are not nearly as bound by location as they were in the past, people consider a wider
range of options when making housing choices, and more frequently choose to live further
away from city centers. Id.
13 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing trend of developers replacing
productive farmland with urban sprawl); Guadalupe T. Luna, "Agricultural Underdogs" and
International Agreements: The Legal Context of Agricultural Workers Within the Rural Econ-
omy, 26 N.M. L. REV. 9, 51 (1996) (noting underlying rationale for developers' attraction to
rural areas).
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cago journalist Robert Heuer points out, "historically, planners' bread
and butter has been planting subdivisions on farmland."' 4
The significant effect of normal market pressures on the pace of
development is exacerbated by the fact that local governments in outly-
ing areas either ignore the fact that agricultural land is being developed
and converted to other uses or even encourage such development. For
example, local governments often promote land development as an eco-
nomic policy because they believe that development will increase the tax
base.' 5 Quite often, these pressures combine to produce land develop-
ment and conversion at a greater pace than local governments can rea-
sonably plan for. 16 Before a local government realizes what is occurring
and implements a proper land use planning scheme to deal with the de-
velopment, the conversion of the locality's agricultural land to other uses
is already well under way. Thus, the development and conversion of
agricultural land often proceeds solely as a function of the market. The
result is that land development in such areas is frequently accomplished
in a scatter-shot, unplanned manner.' 7 In other words, America's most
productive agricultural land, situated in close proximity to large urban
centers, is being replaced with suburban sprawl.' 8 "Traditional rural
communities lying within 65 to 120 kilometers of the metropolitan fringe
show a strong propensity to expand . . . [creating] quite possibl[y] the
final wave of spatial development of large urban centers before urban
agglomeration occurs."' 9
Productive agricultural land is being developed and converted to
other uses at an increasing rate in nearly every state in America. 20 For
example, Atlanta has been referred to as "the most sprawl-threatened re-
14 Tom Daniels & Deborah Bowers, HOLDING OUR GROUND: PROTECTING AMERICA'S
FARMS AND FARMLAND 34-35 (Island Press 1997) [hereinafter HOLDING OUR GROUND].
15 See Cordes, supra note 10, at 442 (discussing governmental subsidization of scattered
development, "especially in terms of roads"); Levy & Melliar-Smith, supra note 2, at 17
("Cash-strapped local governments must, therefore, rely on sales taxes and other revenues
from commercial development to fund their operations. This leads to a competition for devel-
opment, often at the expense of prime agricultural land .... ). This frequently occurs in spite
of the fact that fiscal costs due to service provision demands actually outweigh revenue gener-
ation on developed land. See infra at notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 341 (noting that development is often typified by
"high demand, low costs, and the absence of developmental oversight by local governments.").
17 See id.; Cordes, supra note 10, at 441-42.
18 According to Cordes, while the concept of suburban sprawl is appalling to most Amer-
icans in the abstract, the market does not permit this problem to self-correct. See Cordes,
supra note 10, at 441-42 ("[C]onsumer preferences.., fail to consider the broader social costs
of their actions and thus leads to an inefficient allocation of resources ... the market, as
reflected in consumer choices, fails to consider all the costs and benefits in a transaction; they
are external to the decisionmaking process.").
19 Keller, supra note 9 (noting that the current trend in many urban areas is "emptiness at
the center and growth on the edges")
20 See Major National Findings, supra note 1.
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gion in the United States," based on the fact that the area surrounding the
city loses an average of 2,000 acres of agricultural land to other uses
each month.2' Texas is currently the most sprawl-threatened state in the
nation,2 2 having had 332,800 acres of prime agricultural land developed
and converted to other uses between 1992 and 1997 (a forty-two percent
increase from the previous five years). 23 Even less populous states are
not immune to this phenomenon. For example, 17,800 acres of prime
agricultural land were developed and converted to other uses in Utah
between 1992 and 1997 (a forty-eight percent increase from the previous
five years).24
The negative consequences of such rapid-fire, unplanned develop-
ment and conversion of prime agricultural land are numerous. For one,
America's most productive agricultural land is no longer available to
provide valuable resources necessary for the country's general welfare.
Another equally obvious consequence is that the natural beauty and open
space that once existed is now obliterated. The widespread expansion of
public services necessary to support the newly developed land, such as
sewer systems and roads, not only promotes additional conversion and
sprawl2 5 but also frequently destroys entire ecosystems and contributes
to rising levels of pollution.2 6 Additionally, the subdivisions and strip
malls that typify suburban sprawl often leave behind blight and poverty
in inner cities as much of the populace drifts towards the urban fringe.2 7
Nor is such development beneficial for many of the communities in
which agricultural land is being converted to other uses. For example,
market and governmental forces exert such pressure in favor of develop-
21 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing urban sprawl in Atlanta); Neil R.
Pierce, Urban Sprawl Increasingly a Political Issue, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 12, 1998, at 26
(describing suburban sprawl and resulting problems).
22 See Major National Findings, supra note 1.
23 American Farmland Trust, Fanning on the Edge: Listing of Loss by State, at http://
www.farmland.org/resources/fote/states/allStates.asp [hereinafter Major State Findings].
24 Id. This trend is unlikely to ebb, for Utah's population increased by more than ten
percent between 1995 and 2000. See Levy & Melliar-Smith, supra note 2, at 15.
25 See James H. Wickersham, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New
Modelfor State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 489, 495 (1994). See
also Neil D. Hamilton, Plowing New Ground: Emerging Policy Issues In A Changing Agricul-
ture, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIc. L. 181, 192 (1997) ("While those roads may now be lined with
bountiful farms, the nearby growth and installation of services, such as sewer and water,
means that in five years most of those farms will no longer exist."); HOLDING OUR GROUND,
supra note 14, at 50 ("Civilization follows the sewer line.").
26 See Patrick J. Skelley, Defending the Frontier (Again): Rural Communities, Leapfrog
Development, and Reverse Exclusionary Zoning, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 273, 287 (1997). See
also Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 341 ("This trend increases the rate of stormwater runoff,
which in turn increases the flow of pollutants to discharge areas including rivers and streams.")
(quoting Skelley, supra)).
27 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 340 (discussing how suburban sprawl "acceler-
ates the decline and deterioration" of urban areas); see also Keller, supra note 9 (discussing
growth of the urban fringe).
2006]
64 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
ment that agricultural land is often converted to residential use before the
necessary infrastructure is in place. 28 Thus, many homebuyers moving
to such areas are rewarded with "soaring property tax rates" imposed by
local governments to cover the costs of necessary public services.2 9
Such consequences turn the arguments in favor of development on their
respective heads and beg the question: when does development, espe-
cially development accomplished in an unplanned manner, become a det-
riment to society?
Even if one ignores the many negative consequences of suburban
sprawl and urban agglomeration, agricultural land merits strong protec-
tion from a land use planning perspective because of the numerous bene-
fits it provides. America's agricultural land "provide[s] much of the
nation's food and fiber and has a significant impact on the U.S. econ-
omy."'30 Preserving America's prime agricultural land generally results
in reduced prices for produce; when America is not reliant on foreign
produce, the prices of foreign produce are driven down, resulting in the
competitive pricing of both local and imported goods.3 1 Thus, agricul-
tural land provides a tremendous benefit to the nation's welfare, 32 a ben-
efit that decreases corresponding to the increasing rate at which
agricultural land is developed and converted.
In addition, and contrary to popular belief, protecting agricultural
land rather than allowing it to be developed and converted to other uses
can be economically beneficial to localities as well. As discussed previ-
ously, the market generally sets a trend in favor of increased develop-
ment and conversion. 33 However, the market for land development is
inefficient because many of the actors (consumers, developers, and local
28 See James Poradek, Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan Land-use Planning: Private
Enforcement of Urban Sprawl Control Laws, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1997).
29 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 341.
30 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 338. See also Steven C. Bahis, Preservation of Family
Farms: The Way Ahead, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 311, 322-25 (1997) (discussing society's interest
in protecting safety of its food).
31 See, e.g., Anthony R. Arcaro, Avoiding Constitutional Challenges to Farmland Pres-
ervation Legislation, 24 GONZ. L. REV. 475, 495 (1988-89) ("Cheaper local produce helps
keep down the cost of imported farm products.").
32 While agricultural land protection measures on the national level have largely been
unsuccessful to date, see infra notes 44-84 and accompanying text (discussing failure of agri-
cultural land protection measures imposed by federal government), the federal government has
recognized the importance of agricultural land to the nation's welfare for many years. For
example, the preamble to the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 states that "the maintenance of
the family farm system of agriculture is essential to the social well being of the Nation" and
that farming is "essential to ... the competitive production of adequate supplies of food and
fiber." Pub. L. No. 97-98 § 1608 91 Stat. 1213, 1347 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2266
(1994)).




governments) suffer from an information deficiency. 34 The market for
agricultural land conversion often places so much pressure in favor of
development on these actors that they cannot properly weigh all of the
costs and benefits. 35 Thus, development frequently proceeds in an ad
hoc and unplanned fashion. As a result, most state and local govern-
ments are unaware of and discount the extent to which agricultural land
contributes to the economy.
Agricultural land actually helps subsidize local governments be-
cause the land provides greater revenue in the form of property taxes
than it costs in terms of public services. 36 For example, studies have
demonstrated that agricultural land requires only $0.21 to $0.75 in public
services for every dollar it generates in property tax revenues. 37 In com-
parison, residential land requires $1.05 to $1.67 in public services for
every dollar generated in property tax revenues.38 Thus, while "farmland
protection is fiscally responsible ... residential growth does not pay its
own way."'39 Moreover, while commercial and industrial land uses gen-
erally provide more in tax revenue than they demand in public services,4 0
they also result in suburban sprawl because they "encourage residential
growth and development, whereas farms do not."'4' In addition, commer-
cial farms provide good investment opportunities, supply jobs, raise a
large amount of income, and contribute to the tax base-all while de-
manding few public services expenditures by local governments. Given
these benefits, seldom considered because of market pressures, state and
local governments should recognize that "promoting local agriculture is a
form of economic development. '42 Accordingly, state and local govern-
ments should include agricultural land preservation as a ubiquitous com-
ponent of their land use planning schemes.
In summary, current statistics demonstrate that America's prime ag-
ricultural land is being developed and converted to other uses at an in-
creasing rate nationwide. The conversion of this nation's most
productive agricultural land into suburban sprawl and urban agglomera-
tion is unlikely to dissipate, for the majority of agricultural land is di-
rectly in the path of development and current market pressures favor
34 See, e.g., id. at 441-42 (discussing inefficiency in market for development).
35 See id.
36 See Sean F. Nolan Cozota Solloway, Note and Comment, Preserving Our Heritage:
Tools to Cultivate Agricultural Preservation in New York State, 17 PACE L. REV. 591, 640
(1997); Holly L. Thomas, DUTCHESS CouNTY PLANNING DE'T, TECH MEMO: THE ECONOMIC
BENEFITS OF LAND CONSERVATION 1 (1991).




41 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 339.
42 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 17 (emphasis added).
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development and conversion. Yet, America's agricultural land is a valu-
able resource that provides a benefit, a benefit that is non-renewable once
the land is developed and converted. Accordingly, a comprehensive land
use planning model is needed, one that adequately accounts for the need
to preserve this valuable resource while still allowing development to
occur in a controlled fashion. The fact that agricultural land continues to
be converted at increasing rates demonstrates that current preservation
measures are failing. If a viable solution is not discovered soon, "the last
crop produced on much of the nation's prime farmland will be asphalt. '43
II. A MODEL OF INEFFECTIVENESS: FEDERAL AND STATE
LAND USE PLANNING SCHEMES
As the preceding Section demonstrates, America is in dire need of a
solution to the increasing development and conversion of prime agricul-
tural land. The programs enacted to date have not successfully addressed
this problem, for productive agricultural land is being developed and
converted to other uses in an unplanned and unintelligent manner at in-
creasing rates nationwide. Indeed, it is widely recognized that most pro-
grams, while developed ostensibly to protect agricultural land, have
proven ineffective. 44 A land use planning model that includes the preser-
vation of agricultural land as a major component and is still comprehen-
sive enough to account for the factors that contribute to agricultural land
conversion in various localities is needed. In devising such a plan, it is
appropriate to first consider the actions that have already been taken by
both national and state governments. While no government has enacted
a comprehensive land use planning scheme capable of solving this prob-
lem, the failings of previously enacted plans should inform any discus-
sion of the proper way to engage in comprehensive land use planning.
Progress can never be made when the mistakes of the past are not consid-
ered and addressed. Accordingly, this Section examines actions to pro-
tect agricultural land taken by national and state governments,
respectively.
A. FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND
The federal government has been passing legislation dealing with
agricultural land for many years. For example, during the New Deal the
federal government passed a wide array of agricultural legislation-leg-
islation providing for, among other things, widespread subsidy programs,
43 Solloway, supra note 36, at 595.
44 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 335 ("[M]any of the enacted programs to protect
farmland have proven to be largely ineffective.").
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rehabilitation loans, and government land purchases. 45 However, the es-
calating trends of agricultural land conversion and suburban sprawl have
stimulated a growing national awareness of the problems associated with
these trends in recent years. This awareness has forced the federal gov-
ernment to pay increased attention to the problems by passing legislation
purporting to address these important land use issues.46 As early as
1975, the Committee on Land Use for the United States Department of
Agriculture ("USDA") recommended that the federal government take
steps to maximize the retention of agricultural land.47 In the years since,
the federal government has passed legislation enacting many programs
supposedly designed to stimulate the protection and preservation of agri-
cultural land. 48  However, the federal government has traditionally
viewed land use matters in general-and land use planning schemes in
particular-as matters of local concern. 49 Accordingly, the approach
taken by the federal government has largely been one of abstention,
whereby specific programs are designed to incentivize the private sector
to protect agricultural land. However, these incentive programs are not
deployed as any sort of comprehensive land use planning strategy.50 In
fact, most federal programs enacted to date have been "little more than
token attempts at farmland protection."' 5' In contrast, over ninety federal
spending programs have a significant effect on the location and cost of
private development, but do surprisingly little to regulate or supervise the
industry's impact on agricultural land. For example, the federal highway
program increases access to outlying areas and thus promotes suburban
sprawl. The federal government has, in effect, helped "subsidize[ ] the
45 Todd A. Wildermuth, National Land Use Planning in America, Briefly, 26 J. LAND,
RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 73, 74-75 (2005).
46 This Section deals only with legislation purportedly designed to directly protect and
preserve agricultural land, and thus does not discuss other federal programs that impact agri-
cultural land, such as federal subsidy programs. It should be noted that federal subsidy pro-
grams suffer from the same failings as the rest of the federal legislation, for they are not
deployed as part of a coordinated national land use program. Id. at 80.
47 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 75.
48 This section is in no way meant to be a comprehensive list of federal legislation relat-
ing to agricultural land and suburban sprawl. While Congress has frequently passed legislation
that purports to address the depletion of agricultural lands, few of the enacted programs have
been successful. See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 76. Therefore, this section will
only address the more significant legislative programs. For a more comprehensive discussion
of federal legislation dealing with this issue, see Levy & Melliar-Smith, supra note 2, at
15-18; HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 75-85.
49 The federal government has come remarkably close to adopting a national land use
planning program on two separate occasions: during the New Deal and again during the 1970s.
See Wildermuth, supra note 45, at 75-78. Both times, the proposed program failed miserably.
Id. Wildermuth describes the federal government's current strategy with regard to land use
planning as "piecemeal." Id. at 73.
50 See, e.g., HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 75 ("[T]he federal government has
nothing close to a coherent strategy to protect farmland.").
51 Id. at 76.
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conversion of millions of acres in farmland over the past fifty years" due
to the surprisingly few steps that it has taken to coordinate its various
programs.5 2 While the vast majority of federal legislation has done little
to curtail the rapid development of agricultural land, several programs
are worth noting, though more for their failings than for their successes.
In 1981, Congress passed the Farmland Protection Policy Act 53
("FPPA") after a study of the nation's agricultural lands demonstrated
that a large amount of productive agricultural land had been developed
and converted to other uses between 1967 and 1977.54 The goal of the
FPPA was to reduce federal contribution to agricultural land depletion by
forcing federal agencies to coordinate their administration of federal pro-
grams with agricultural land preservation policies and programs adminis-
tered by state and local governments. 55 Under the FPPA, a federal
agency is required to submit a Farmland Conversion Rating Form to the
Natural Resources Conservation Service whenever a federally funded
project will contribute to farmland conversion. 56 These reports serve as
the basis for a yearly presentation that the USDA gives to Congress re-
garding "the impacts of federal programs and projects on farmland con-
version."'57 However, this reporting scheme serves as little more than an
information-gathering vehicle for Congress. Because the FPPA does not
require that federal agencies actually take any action to minimize the
impact of federal programs on the conversion of agricultural land, federal
agencies may proceed to administer their programs as they like. 58 Ac-
cordingly, the only real benefit of the reporting requirement is trans-
parency, which amounts to little more than a "bland acknowledgement of
concern, setting forth a very limited role for the federal government" in
land use planning. 59
However, the FPPA does contain one distinct benefit: the creation
of a land evaluation and site assessment ("LESA") system.60 The LESA
is a statistical rating system that attempts to objectively rate the quality
52 Id.
53 Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1341 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994)).
54 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 76.
55 Id. at 76-77.
56 Id. at 77.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 334.
60 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 77-78. It should be noted that the LESA
system is not the first information gathering system to be organized at the federal level. Dur-
ing the New Deal, the USDA organized a land use reporting system that transmitted data from
the county level to the federal government, although the approach was much less sophisticated.
See, e.g., Wildermuth, supra note 45, at 75 (describing data collection system during the New




and productivity of agricultural land on a numerical basis. 6 ' The objec-
tive of the LESA system is to gather data that will assist state and local
governments in identifying prime agricultural land for preservation.62
However, the federal LESA system suffers from a serious shortcoming in
that the rating of agricultural land is generally lowered (and thus deemed
less worthy of protection) as surrounding developmental pressures in-
crease. 63 Thus, under the federal LESA system, the rating of America's
most productive farmland - the vast majority of which is located near
large urban areas - is artificially deflated. For example, highly produc-
tive agricultural land in areas such as California's Central Valley re-
ceives a low rating under the federal LESA system despite being some of
the most productive agricultural land in the entire United States. 64 De-
spite its failings, however, the federal LESA system has been used as a
land use planning mechanism in a majority of states; by 1996, the system
was being used in over thirty states. 65
Following its initial attempt to preserve agricultural land with the
FPPA, Congress enacted the 1985 Farm Bill a few years later. 66 This
legislation was designed to promote the preservation of agricultural land
by providing an incentive for private landowners to establish conserva-
tion easements on their land.67 The Bill accomplished this through a
debt-reduction-for-easement provision that empowered the Farm Service
Agency ("FSA") "to reduce the debt obligation of farmers who donate a
conservation easement on their nonproductive land to the agency. ' '68
However, the program was almost a complete failure, as virtually no
landowners chose to enroll with the FSA. While over 66,000 agricultural
landowners had contacted the agency to attempt to have their debt re-
duced as of 1989, only approximately 400 actually expressed a desire to
be considered for the program. 69
Congress has also passed several acts designed to either grant or
lend federal funds to states for use in protecting agricultural lands. For
example, in 1990 Congress passed the Farms for the Future Act
("FFA"). 70 The FFA enacted a "purchase of development rights"
("PDR") program, whereby the federal government would lend federal
money to states to be used to purchase the development rights on pri-
61 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 77.
62 See, e.g., id. at 77-81 (describing federal LESA system and its uses).
63 Id. at 80.
64 Id. at 81.
65 Id.
66 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
67 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 81.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Farms for the Future Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 1401 (1991).
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vately-owned agricultural land.71 Under the FFA, the federal govern-
ment allocated up to ten million dollars in federal money per year to be
lent to states willing to match half of the federal funds.72 The FFA was
replaced six years later when Congress upped the ante by passing the
Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 ("FAIR"). 73
FAIR replaced the lending approach of the FFA by simply allocating
federal grant money for states with dedicated farmland preservation pro-
grams to purchase conservation easements on privately owned agricul-
tural land.74 The program, known as the Farmland Protection Program,
allocated thirty-five million dollars in federal grant money to be used to
purchase such easements. 75 However, the program had very limited suc-
cess and was shortly repealed.76 FAIR was then replaced by the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 200277 ("FSRIA"), which does lit-
tle more than update FAIR and signal a return to the fund-matching na-
ture of the FSA.78 Under the FSRIA, the Secretary of Agriculture is
authorized "to purchase land or conservation easements for the purpose
of protecting topsoil by limiting nonagricultural uses of the land."'79 The
purchases are accomplished by the USDA partnering with state and local
governments as well as nongovernmental organizations to provide up to
half of the fair market value for such easements. 80 Thus, as with the
FSA, the FSRIA only requires the federal government to provide half of
the funds for conservation easements.
Two major flaws exist regarding the legislation described above, all
of which was supposedly designed to increase the preservation of pro-
ductive agricultural land. First, the federal government has done remark-
ably little to ensure that its legislative programs function as part of a
comprehensive land use planning program designed to preserve agricul-
tural land. Instead, the federal government has passed legislation that
functions in isolation and merely provides incentives for private land-
owners to refrain from developing their agricultural land.81 These incen-
tive schemes usually contain only one "tool" to do the job, such as a
71 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 82. PDR programs are discussed in
further depth infra at notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
72 Id.
73 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110
Stat. 972 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7201 (1996)).
74 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 335.
75 Id.
76 Id. (stating that FAIR contained "minor but encouraging efforts .. . to preserve
farmland.").
77 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 116 Stat. 134
(2002).
78 See Levy & Melliar-Smith, supra note 2, at 16.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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PDR program or a fund-matching program designed to stimulate the
purchase of conservation easements. Such schemes are woefully inade-
quate to combat the pervasive market pressures to develop agricultural
land that exist on a state and local level. Because "states, and particu-
larly local governments . . . implement[ ] the majority of land use con-
trols,"' 82 simply providing funding is not sufficient in localities that do
not approach land use planning in a deliberate and reasoned manner.
The trend in favor of development is so prevalent that simply placing
conservation easements on land in a haphazard manner may do little
good. While "the federal funding role for farmland preservation is likely
to expand ... as the squeeze on farmland resources continues,' 83 Con-
gress' funding programs would be much more successful in preserving
productive agricultural land if they were deployed as merely one part of a
comprehensive land use planning model.
Second, most of the federal legislation enacted to date employs the
most expensive land use planning tools, which are unlikely to prevent
America's most productive agricultural land from being converted to
other uses. The FFA, FAIR, and FSRIA all employ either PDR or con-
servation easement programs, and they all use federal funds, either exclu-
sively or in combination with state funds, to purchase development rights
from private landowners. 84 The problem with such legislative schemes
is that a high percentage of the most productive agricultural land in the
country is located near urban areas, and is likely to have a high fair mar-
ket value. Therefore, funds used to purchase development rights to such
land do not go very far. Moreover, landowners in such areas may be
reluctant to sell the development rights to their land once the fair market
value reaches a certain point. For example, if a landowner is given the
choice to sell his land outright at $50,000 per acre, or sell only the devel-
opment rights at $25,000 per acre, the decision may be a foregone con-
clusion. The bottom line is that when only these limited land use
planning tools are employed, very little is actually accomplished in the
way of protecting America's most productive agricultural land. To the
extent these tools are deployed, Congress needs to take steps to ensure
that their impact is maximized. Again, if these programs were imple-
mented as part of a comprehensive land use planning model, Congress'
funds would go much further. Otherwise, the impact of federal legisla-
tion will continue to be minimal.
82 See Levy & Melliar-Smith, supra note 2, at 15.
83 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 83.
84 See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
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B. STATE AND LOCAL PROTECTION FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND
Nearly all substantive programs designed to protect agricultural land
are implemented at a state or local level. 85 Certainly, the federal govern-
ment still has an important role to play in effective land use planning,
particularly from an organizational perspective. However, state and local
governments necessarily implement many land use planning measures
because some land use planning "tools" are not readily available to the
federal government. 86 As the conversion of agricultural land has become
an increasingly relevant issue in recent years, more and more state and
local governments have begun implementing various programs designed
to protect their productive agricultural land.87 In fact, every state cur-
rently has in place some form of legislation designed to protect and pre-
serve agricultural land, although the level of protection varies widely
from state to state.88
While every state has implemented some sort of program designed
to protect agricultural land, "[m]ost states have not done a good job of
coordinating these techniques into a strategic package," 89 which helps
explain the increasing rate of farmland conversion. Even Oregon's land
use planning program, widely hailed as "the most successful in the nation
and imitated by several states," 90 has not been entirely successful. Ore-
gon's agricultural land continues to be converted at increasing rates de-
spite the fact that for many years Oregon had the most comprehensive
land use planning model in the nation. 91 Therefore, while farmland con-
version has been recognized as a concern in every state, there currently
exists no universally recognized solution to the problem. This Section
discusses a variety of land use planning techniques implemented by state
and local governments and addresses both the positive and negative as-
pects of each technique. The Section also discusses Oregon's land use
planning model in depth by pointing out the various techniques used by
Oregon on both a state and local level and addressing the problems Ore-
85 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 335 ("As a result of both Congress' apparent
inability to preserve farmland and current prevailing national sentiment, the difficult task of
preserving farmland has been left primarily to the state legislatures and local governments.").
86 For example, zoning schemes are frequently deployed in efforts to balance the need to
develop land with the need to preserve it. Because zoning schemes do not lend themselves
particularly well to oversight on a national level, they are necessarily implemented by state and
local governments. See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 105-28 (describing various
zoning schemes and the role state and local governments play in their implementation).
87 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 355.
88 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88-89. See also Cordes, supra note 10,
at 420 ("All levels of government have perceived farmland preservation as an important socie-
tal goal ....").
89 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88.
90 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 352.
91 See Major National Findings, supra note I; infra notes 152-80 and accompanying text.
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gon has encountered in administering its comprehensive land use plan-
ning scheme.
1. Land Use Planning "Tools" for State and Local Governments
State and local governments currently utilize a wide variety of land
use planning techniques to protect and preserve agricultural land. To
begin with, every state now offers a favorable property tax program de-
signed to tax land according to its value as agricultural land, rather than
its fair market value.92 For example, agricultural land in Utah is taxed
"according to its use value" 93 under the Farmland Assessment Act
("FAA"). 94 The FAA was enacted because, as is the case in many states,
"urban growth was encroaching on rural areas and ... if farmland was
taxed at market value, farmers ... would find it difficult to continue to
devote their property to low-profit farming operations. '95 This problem
is typical of the situation facing agricultural land in many states.96 Agri-
cultural land located near urban areas is likely to have a much higher fair
market value than agricultural land in rural localities. If agricultural land
in urban localities is taxed at its fair market value rather than according
to its current use, the taxes are likely to be exponentially higher. When
this occurs, agricultural land owners may be forced to sell their land to
developers simply because, as a result of the tax scheme, it is not finan-
cially efficient to continue to use the land for agricultural production.
While property tax programs designed to benefit owners of agricul-
tural land do decrease developmental pressure,97 they are easily manipu-
lated when not employed with other land use planning techniques as part
of a comprehensive plan to protect agricultural land. It is not uncommon
for developers to purchase agricultural land, maintain it for a period of
time as agricultural land to benefit from the favorable tax scheme, and
then develop and convert it to other uses. For example, in Utah the FAA
permits landowners a tax deduction for agricultural use when a parcel of
land is five acres or larger and meets the other requirements in the act
regarding agricultural production. 98 In Board of Equalization of Salt
Lake County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n ex rel. Judd 99 the Utah Supreme
Court considered the application of the FAA to a parcel of agricultural
land that had been subdivided for development and sale, yet maintained
92 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88.
93 County Bd. Of Equalization Wasatch County v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational
Fonds, 2000 UT 57, 10, 6 P.3d 559, 562 (Utah 2000).
94 Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-501 to -515 (2003).
95 County Bd. Of Equalization Wasatch County, 2000 UT 57, $ 10, 6 P.3d at 562.
96 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 87.
97 Id.
98 Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-503 (2003).
99 846 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1993).
2006]
74 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
as agricultural land until development began in order to qualify for the
tax exemption.l°° Though the court noted that such a use did "not com-
port" with the intent of the statute and stated that the FAA effectively
created a "tax loophole" for developers, the court allowed the tax deduc-
tion because it technically comported with the statute. 10
Every state has also enacted some form of a "right-to-farm" law,
which helps protect agricultural landowners operating in areas contigu-
ous to urban or suburban areas from private nuisance suits.' 0 2 Right-to-
farm laws protect agricultural landowners by limiting the circumstances
under which neighboring landowners can bring a cause of action based
on nuisance. '0 3 For example, an agricultural landowner may need to fer-
tilize his fields in the spring. Fertilization frequently causes unpleasant
odors, which neighboring landowners may want to prevent. However, in
localities with right-to-farm laws, the neighboring landowners would
likely be unable to bring a nuisance suit to enjoin the agricultural land-
owner from fertilizing. Thus, right-to-farm laws have the effect of spar-
ing agricultural landowners from incurring certain litigation expenses.
While favorable tax schemes and right-to-farm laws are employed
by every state in America, 10 4 other land use planning tools are not as
pervasive. The extent to which agricultural land is protected and the va-
riety of tools that are employed greatly varies from state to state. Per-
haps the most important land use planning tool is the agricultural zoning
scheme, along with its many variants and complementary programs.
Every state already utilizes some form of zoning scheme to classify vari-
ous categories of land and define the uses to which a parcel of land may
be put in each category. For example, land may be zoned for commer-
cial, residential, or agricultural use, with these categories further divided
into subcategories to delineate various uses allowed within each cate-
gory. In general, agricultural zoning schemes "impose[ ] restrictions on
100 Id. at 1296-97.
101 Id. Developers' manipulation of tax schemes intended to benefit agricultural land is
becoming an increasingly common method of keeping the cost of property low pending sale
for development. See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 87. For another clear exam-
ple of a farmland tax program being manipulated, see SKS Property v. Multnomah County
Assessor, No. TC-MD 021135C, 2003 WL 22319429 (Or. Tax Magis. Div. 2003). In SKS
Property, the plaintiff grew vegetables on a six-acre parcel of property until the property sold
in order to qualify for a special assessment only available for agricultural land. Id. at * 1. The
court upheld the special assessment under the terms of the statute at issue. Id. at *4. The
lesson from these cases is that courts are often constrained to interpret these types of statutes
literally, even when the application of the statute is clearly counter to its purpose. When tax
schemes that are supposed to benefit agricultural land are not implemented as part of a greater
plan to protect and preserve agricultural land, the result is frequently the creation of a tax
loophole for developers and increasing developmental pressure.
i02 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88-90.
103 Id. at 90-91.
104 Id. at 88-90.
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the amount and type of development" that may occur within the zone,
thereby preventing the land from being converted to other uses.' 0 5 Agri-
cultural zoning schemes have become the "most widely used means by
which municipalities restrict development and preserve farmland,"' 10 6
and are now "the foundation of most farmland preservation efforts."'' 0 7
As of 1997, twenty-six states utilized agricultural zoning in some
form. 1o8
In general, there are two major types of agricultural zoning
schemes: exclusive and non-exclusive agricultural zoning, the latter be-
ing the most popular. 10 9 An exclusive agricultural zoning scheme typi-
cally "prohibits any use of the land other than agricultural," although
"compatible or accessory buildings" are usually allowed.°10 Because ex-
clusive agricultural zoning schemes are so restrictive, they are usually
used only when "farming is the dominant land use, the farmland is in
large contiguous blocks, and there are few nonfarm dwellings or other
nonfarm buildings in the area.""' Exclusive agricultural zoning "avoids
the problem of leapfrog and buckshot development," or suburban sprawl,
because it is usually applied to large areas of land."12 Thus, exclusive
agricultural zoning schemes are highly effective land use control devices
when it comes to simply preserving productive agricultural land. How-
ever, because exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are so restrictive,
they also run a high risk of provoking litigation, particularly Fifth
Amendment "takings" challenges,' '3 when applied to areas with any sort
of non-agricultural development already in place. Few states have used
exclusive agricultural zoning schemes, although Hawaii, Oregon, and
105 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 348.
106 Id.; see also HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 106 ("Agricultural zoning is the
most common land-use technique for limiting the development of farmland."); Jerome E.
Rose, Farmland Preservation Policy and Programs, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 591, 600 (1984)
(discussing prevalence of agricultural zoning to protect farmland).
107 Cordes, supra note 10, at 422.
108 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88.
109 Cordes, supra note 10, at 423.
1 10 Id. at 423. In Oregon. where exclusive agricultural zoning is used extensively, acces-
sory uses are often protected as fiercely as primary agricultural lands. For example, in Eugene
Sand & Gravel v. Lane County, 74 P.3d 1085 (Or. Ct. App. 2003), the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals upheld the county's consideration of a farm stand as an accessory use in denying the
defendant's rezoning request in an exclusive farm use area. Id. at 1092. The court held that
the farm stand was an "agricultural use," and therefore it was proper for the county to consider
the effects of rezoning, including increased traffic, dust, and lost resources, on the farm stand.
Id. at 1086.
I I HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 115.
112 Id.
1 13 Takings challenges are discussed at length in relation to land use planning tools infra
at notes 183-216 and accompanying text.
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Wisconsin have successfully introduced them as part of their state land
use planning models.' 14
In contrast with exclusive agricultural zoning schemes, non-exclu-
sive agricultural zoning schemes allow land within the zoned area to be
used for non-agricultural purposes, though agricultural use is usually en-
couraged and stimulated by the particular structure of the scheme. 1 5
When properly used, non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are ex-
tremely effective in balancing competing interests, particularly between
development and preservation. These schemes, because of their flexibil-
ity, are used much more widely than exclusive agricultural zoning
schemes.
Non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are implemented in a
variety of ways. For example, many state and local governments pre-
serve agricultural land by implementing large minimum lot size restric-
tions. 1 16 These restrictions are usually tailored to correspond to the
minimum size of parcels of agricultural land in the area.' '7 This is a
particularly popular technique because the size restrictions can be
changed gradually as needed to allow development to proceed in an or-
derly and planned fashion." 8 Another approach often utilized in non-
exclusive agricultural zones is to allow more intense development of land
based on the size of the parcel. This is usually accomplished by the
implementation of a "sliding-scale" agricultural zone, "which decreases
the dwellings per acre as the acreage goes up."'" 9 For example, a slid-
ing-scale zone might permit one dwelling for the first five acres, two for
the first twenty, and so on. The effect is to "permit [ ] eater residential
development for smaller parcels,"' 20 which are more likely to have
passed into the residential or commercial land market due to their size
and decreased profitability. Another form of area-based allocation is the
fixed-area allocation, which is a simple allocation of building rights ac-
cording to acreage,'21 For example, in a zone which allowed one dwell-
ing per twenty-five acres, a landowner who owned one hundred acres
could build four dwellings.
Non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes frequently employ
buffer zones to concentrate development in certain areas within the
broader agricultural zone. This is often accomplished through "cluster
114 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 115. See also Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at
352-53 (discussing Oregon's statewide farmland preservation program).









zoning," which "establishes overall density restrictions . . . but permits
small lot 'clustering' of actual development on the property."'' 22 For ex-
ample, in an agricultural zone with a twenty-five acre minimum lot size,
a landowner with one hundred acres would be entitled to four dwellings,
but the owner would be permitted to "cluster" them in a corner of the
property and preserve the rest of the property as open agricultural space.
Often utilized in suburban settings, critics contend that cluster zoning can
lead to conflicts with non-farming neighbors, fragmentation of farmland,
and an atmosphere of impermanence.' 23 A more popular approach is to
simply create a transitional buffer zone between areas zoned for agricul-
tural and residential or commercial use. Though zoned for agricultural
use, a buffer zone typically has a smaller minimum lot size requirement,
such as five or ten acres. Buffer zones have the advantage of allowing
planning for future development while still preserving prime agricultural
land because development can proceed outside the agricultural zone and
eventually proceed to the buffer zone when the locality deems it
appropriate.
A distinction must be drawn between a buffer zone implemented
within an agricultural zoning scheme and an urban growth boundary
("UGB"). A UGB is, "in essence, a line drawn beyond which develop-
ment will be prohibited, thus directing growth pressure inward instead of
sprawling out.' 24 In comparison to a transitional buffer zone, a UGB
simply establishes a set boundary between agriculturally zoned land and
land zoned for other uses. UGBs are most often imposed on land imme-
diately contiguous to developed land, thus preserving the undeveloped
areas beyond. Because of this, UGB areas tend to experience a great
deal of market pressure from the abutting urban land. As a result, local
governments may feel heightened pressure to grant variances to allow
parcels of land within the agricultural zone to be used for other purposes,
and eventually to rezone the agricultural land entirely.
Agricultural zoning has become the most common land use plan-
ning tool used to protect agricultural land because it offers "several dis-
tinct advantages"' 25 over other land use control devices. Because zoning
in general is "a familiar and widely used land use control mechanism,"1 26
most people recognize and understand zoning on some level, which is
likely to lead to greater acceptance. In addition, agricultural zoning
schemes "restrict[ ] a landowner's own decision to convert the property
to more intensive uses, thus avoiding the limitations of voluntary pro-
122 Id. at 423-24.
123 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 122-23.
124 Cordes, supra note 10, at 424. See also HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at
133-44 (providing a comprehensive discussion of UGBs).
125 Cordes, supra note 10, at 422.
126 Id.
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grams" such as conservation easements. 127 Agricultural zoning schemes
are also less expensive from the government's perspective compared to
other land use control devices because the cost of preservation is placed
on individual landowners. 128 By eliminating development opportunities
and restricting land to agricultural use, agricultural zoning "shift[s] the
cost of farmland preservation from society as a whole to landowners
themselves."' 12 9 Thus, agricultural zoning defuses, to an extent, the most
prevalent factor influencing the conversion of productive agricultural
land: market demand.
Agricultural zoning is particularly effective in defusing market pres-
sures that tend to build up when a locality is successful in zoning a large
area of land for agricultural use. 130 With agricultural zoning, localities
can preserve their most productive land, creating a "critical mass" to
"keep individual farmers from becoming isolated islands in a sea of resi-
dential neighborhoods."' 3 1 This helps "limit land speculation, which
drives up the fair market value of farm and ranch land," and also helps
reinforce the concept of "agriculture as a long-term, economically viable
activity, instead of an interim land use."' 132 When a large amount of agri-
cultural land is preserved, agricultural zoning "keep[s] land prices down
and reduce[s] the pressure to sell for the higher development value."' 133
In addition, landowners are less likely to find themselves embroiled in
nuisance suits, for they are less likely to be surrounded "by neighbors
who are offended by noxious farm odors and chemical spraying."'' 34 A
properly implemented agricultural zoning scheme also "helps promote
orderly growth by preventing sprawl into rural areas."' 135 In short, agri-
cultural zoning schemes can be an extremely effective land use planning
tool in protecting agricultural land, promoting organized development,
and preventing uncontrolled sprawl.
127 Id. Voluntary land use preservation tools are discussed in further depth infra at notes
146-51 and accompanying text.
128 For example, PDR programs use taxpayer money to purchase development rights from
owners of agricultural land. See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 345-48 (discussing PDR
programs). These programs are discussed in further depth infra at notes 145-48 and accompa-
nying text.
129 See Cordes, supra note 10, at 435.
130 See, e.g., id. at 445 (agricultural zoning schemes are "able to quickly preserve large
tracts of contiguous land for farming, creating an assurance of insulation and stability for [the]
future").
131 American Farmland Trust: Farmland Information Center, Agricultural Protection Zon-
ing Fact Sheet at http://farmlandinfo.org/documents/29478/FSAPZ_9-98.pdf#search=%22
Agricultural%20Protection%2OZoning [hereinafter Farmland Information].
132 Id.
133 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 348.
134 Id.
135 See Farmland Information, supra note 131.
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Despite their many advantages, agricultural zoning schemes are not
without their problems. Agricultural zoning is not a permanent measure
to preserve farmland because rezonings can occur by a vote of the local
legislature. 136 Because the character and disposition of localities are
never a constant, land that is zoned for agricultural use may be rezoned
once citizens who want to sell their land at a higher developmental value
garner enough support to prompt a rezoning. This is especially problem-
atic given that those who have their land zoned for agricultural use often
perceive as unfair the placement of societal preservation costs on a few
landowners. 137 Agricultural zoning may remove equity and credit values
from the land because land zoned for agricultural use is likely to be less
valuable than developable land, reducing the amount of equity against
which landowners may borrow.' 38 Landowners who hold the majority of
their wealth in their land may "view their land as both a retirement fund
and an insurance policy."'1 39 In addition, because much of the country's
productive agricultural land is located on the urban fringe, landowners in
such areas may not see agricultural zoning as a guarantee against subur-
ban sprawl and eventual conversion. 140 Thus, many agricultural land-
owners resent agricultural zoning because it infringes on their ability to
sell their land at its highest value, and believe that "if most of the bene-
fits from preservation go to society as a whole, then the cost of preserva-
tion should be placed on society as well."' 14 1 Because landowners
frequently dispute the fairness and validity of agricultural zoning, agri-
cultural zoning schemes often provoke legal challenges. 142
In addition, when agricultural zoning schemes are not properly im-
plemented, they may actually lead to heightened developmental pres-
sures and increased suburban sprawl. For example, if a locality with a
large amount of land zoned for agricultural use consistently grants vari-
ances that allow intensive development, the effectiveness of the agricul-
tural zoning scheme is sacrificed. Also, many localities employ
agricultural zones that permit residential development on smaller parcels
of land. 14 3 Such agricultural zoning schemes are easily manipulated to
create large blocks of agricultural "estates," which are nothing more than
residential land on which agricultural production is done only to the ex-
136 Cordes, supra note 10, at 349.
137 See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 10 at 435-39 (discussing economic impact of agricultural
zoning on those whose land is zoned for agricultural use).
138 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 348-49; Farmland Information, supra note 130.
139 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 109.
140 Id.
141 Cordes, supra note 10, at 435.
142 Id. at 422.
143 See, e.g., Farmland Information, supra note 131 ("Many towns and counties have
agricultural/residential zoning that allows construction of houses on lots of one to five acres.").
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tent necessary to meet the minimum required by the zoning scheme. I
Thus, developers can easily accomplish an end-run around an agricul-
tural zoning scheme that is not implemented in a comprehensive, well-
planned manner. Such ineffective agricultural zoning schemes "often
hasten the decline of agriculture by allowing residences to consume far
more land than necessary,"' 45 leading to leapfrog development and en-
hanced suburban sprawl.
Whereas non-voluntary agricultural zoning schemes place the costs
of preservation on individual landowners, other land use planning tools
place the burden directly on taxpayers. For example, PDR programs use
tax proceeds to purchase development rights directly from agricultural
landowners. 146 Closely related to PDR programs are transfer of develop-
ment rights ("TDR") programs, which transfer developable land to land-
owners in exchange for the development rights on landowners'
agricultural land. 147 Conservation easements work in a very similar
manner-the owner of the agricultural land grants an easement to allow
agricultural production to continue. Conservation easements can either
be bought with tax funds, as with PDR or TDR programs, or donated by
agricultural landowners. These land use planning tools avoid the pres-
sures which agricultural zoning schemes are subject to because the per-
mitted use of the land cannot be changed by a simple rezoning. Rather,
the development rights to the land must be bought from their holder,
usually the state or federal government.1 48 However, because these pro-
grams are voluntary, they do not produce the same results as agricultural
zoning schemes. Donated conservation easements, for example, are only
implemented at the whim of private landowners. PDR, TDR, and pur-
chased conservation easement programs are very expensive, and as a re-
sult have little impact on preserving productive agricultural land when
they are not implemented as part of a larger land use planning scheme.
When voluntary programs are implemented to purchase development
rights on productive agricultural land, the funds are not likely to stretch
144 See, e.g., HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 129 (discussing the agricultural
zoning scheme in Oregon's Willamette Valley, which has allowed hundreds of "hobby farms"
to replace large blocks of productive agricultural land). See also Farmland Information, supra
note 131 (noting how the agricultural zoning schemes in Wyoming and Colorado have allowed
"the creation of hundreds of 35-acre 'ranchettes"'); Paul Snyder, How Does a Small, Agricul-
tural County Manage Growth? at http://www.law.du.edu/rmlui/HotTopics (discussing adop-
tion of thirty-five acre lot size in Colorado).
145 Farmland Information, supra note 131.
146 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 345.
147 Id. at 346.
148 See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing federal legislation permit-
ting federal funds, either alone or in combination with state funds, to be used to purchase
development rights to agricultural land).
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very far because most productive agricultural land is located on the urban
fringe and therefore likely to have a high fair market value.
The role of non-governmental actors should not be overlooked in
considering the effectiveness of voluntary programs. There are a variety
of non-governmental entities, such as land trusts, that operate outside of
the formal governmental structure and use private funds to purchase the
development rights to agricultural land or even to purchase the land out-
right. 149 These private organizations typically work at a local level, al-
though national organizations such as the Nature Conservancy are
organized for the same purpose. 150 Such organizations frequently inter-
vene when land use planning measures are not adequately protecting and
preserving agricultural land. '51 Unfortunately, their efforts are organized
only according to their internal plans, and not as part of a comprehensive
government effort. As a result, these organizations function in an ad hoc
manner, much like the federal government. If land use planning had any
sort of direction on a national level, the efforts of these organizations
would be far more effective because they could organize their work in a
manner that complemented a national plan.
In summary, many different land use planning tools are available to
help states protect and preserve their valuable agricultural land. How-
ever, these tools are rarely successful when employed in isolation.
Rather, each tool has its respective strengths and weaknesses. Therefore,
the most effective way to balance the competing interests between devel-
opment and preservation is to deploy these tools in a manner that allows
them to complement one another. The increasing rates of agricultural
land conversion can be explained, at least in part, by states' general fail-
ure to implement a comprehensive land use planning model that accom-
plishes this synergistic effect. However, several states have attempted to
do exactly that, though not with resounding success. The following Sec-
tion examines Oregon's comprehensive land use planning model, which
incorporates a variety of the land use planning tools discussed above.
2. Oregon: An (Almost) Effective Statewide Land Use Planning
Model
The statewide land use planning program in place in Oregon, 52 de-
signed to protect and preserve agricultural land, has been credited as the
149 See Wildermuth, supra note 45, at 79-80.
150 Nature Conservancy, About Us: About the Nature Conversancy, at http://www.nature.
org/aboutuS.
151 Id.
152 Oregon's 2004 voter initiative, known as Measure 37, codified as Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 197.352 (2005), dramatically altered the application of the state's land use planning scheme.
See infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
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most comprehensive model in the nation.1 53 As a result, several states
have recently enacted similar programs. 154 However, studies have
shown that productive agricultural land continues to be developed and
converted to other uses in Oregon at increasing rates, despite the exis-
tence of the comprehensive model. Therefore, while the Oregon plan
serves as an example of the manner in which various land use planning
tools can be used to complement one another, it is also a lesson in the
intricacies and pratfalls inherent in balancing the need for development
with the goal of agricultural preservation.
In 1973, Oregon implemented a state-wide land use planning pro-
gram featuring a farmland protection program. 155 Oregon's program set
out certain statewide land use planning goals, including the protection of
agricultural land, and empowered the state government to periodically
review each county's comprehensive land use planning program to en-
sure that it complied with state goals. 156 Under the program, each county
in Oregon is required to identify its prime agricultural lands, designate
them in its comprehensive plan, and zone them for exclusive farm use
("EFU"). 157 These EFU zones allow only agricultural production and
accessory uses. In EFU zones, agricultural land benefits from property
tax deferrals and right-to-farm laws protect the land from nuisance
suits. 1 58 In addition to the mandatory EFU zones, many counties in Ore-
gon have created UGBs and buffer zones designed to direct residential
and commercial development inward and prevent suburban sprawl from
claiming intermediate agricultural land. 159
In addition to the program, the Oregon Legislature also created a
Land Use Board of Appeals ("LUBA"), a three-judge panel that decides
all land use cases. 160 While LUBA decisions are binding, parties have
the ability to appeal to the state courts. 16 1 Oregon courts have held that
citizens are entitled to a private right of action with regard to land use
issues, 162 and have construed standing broadly, allowing anyone who
participates in a local proceeding and asserts a position on the merits to
appeal an adverse decision. 163 Finally, the Oregon Supreme Court has
153 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 352.
154 Id.
155 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 128.
156 See id.
157 See id.; see also Cordes, supra note 10, at 352 (discussing Oregon's land use
program).
158 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 128.
159 Id.
160 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.540 (2005).
161 See id. § 197.850(1); see also id. § 197.540.
162 See Cordes, supra note 10, at 353.




held that zoning decisions are not entitled to presumptive validity, which
effectively shifts the burden of proof in cases challenging zoning deci-
sions to local governments and requires the local governments to justify
land use decisions in light of the comprehensive land use planning
program. 164
While Oregon has shown great foresight by enacting a statewide
land use planning program to address agricultural land conversion, the
program has its deficiencies. As discussed above, prime agricultural land
continues to be converted at increasing rates in Oregon. This may indi-
cate that the state is not managing its growth in a way that strikes a
proper balance between development and agricultural land protection. It
has been suggested that the increased rates of conversion are a result of
the program being implemented too slowly.165 However, given the thirty
years Oregon has had to fine-tune the program, it now seems safe to
conclude that systemic problems, such as those detailed below, are en-
demic to the program.
Oregon's statewide adoption of land use planning goals, while laud-
able, is insufficient to establish the infrastructure necessary to control
development. Under the current program, each county must comply with
statewide goals, but the comprehensive land use plan varies by county.
Oregon's program would be far more efficient if this structure was re-
versed and Oregon adopted a flexible, comprehensive statewide plan in-
stead. Oregon could then provide each county with an established
framework to help implement statewide goals. The implementation of
the state plan could be tailored to each county's needs while ensuring
consistency with Oregon's goal, thereby balancing development with
protection.
Oregon's land use plan has also proven disappointingly incapable of
responding to ordinary market pressures. The UGBs and buffer zones
employed by many counties in Oregon have actually increased suburban
sprawl and the conversion of productive agricultural land because of the
widespread prevalence of "hobby farms."' 166 For example, over 350,000
acres of land are zoned for rural residential-with three to five acre mini-
mum lot sizes-in the Willamette Valley, arguably Oregon's most pro-
ductive agricultural region. 167 As discussed above, zoning schemes that
allow such development promote suburban sprawl as the land becomes
more developed.168 In addition, Oregon's UGB's and buffer zones have
164 See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 29 (Or. 1973) (en banc), over-
ruled on other grounds by Neuburger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980).
165 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 129.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See supra Part II.
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shown a great tendency to increase housing prices within their bounda-
ries.169 As the development of land and house prices increase, suburban
sprawl and leapfrog development are encouraged because the market ex-
ens pressure to expand outward to EFU zones.170 Thus, the allowance of
"hobby farms" seriously endangers productive agricultural land. 171
The deficiencies of Oregon's land use planning scheme have also
been exacerbated by the passage of a voter's initiative known as Measure
37 in 2004.172 Measure 37 is a regulatory takings law designed to ac-
complish an end-run around Oregon's land use planning scheme and to
frustrate many of its provisions. 73 The initiative passed in large part
because of the widespread public perception that Oregon's land use plan-
ning scheme was heavy-handed and inconsistent. 174 Under Measure 37,
the government is required to either compensate property owners for re-
ductions in the fair market value of their property due to land use restric-
tions or forgo applying the land use restriction to the affected parcel. 175
Thus, the initiative reverses the effect of Oregon's land use planning
scheme and guts most of its major provisions, preventing the government
from enforcing them. 176 The implementation of the initiative was
delayed due to court battles for a time following its passage, but the
Oregon Supreme court ultimately upheld it against a state constitutional
challenge in February of 2006.177 Measure 37 is only now beginning to
take effect, and while its long term impact is still unknown, many Ore-
gon citizens already view it as a complete disaster because of the unpre-
dictability in development that it creates. 178 Nonetheless, similar
proposals were on the ballot in several other states in 2006.179
In conclusion, Oregon set a standard by being the first state to adopt
a statewide program designed to protect agricultural land. Yet, the
mixed success of the program and the deficiencies identified above
demonstrate that even Oregon's plan has its failings. Moreover, the
statewide revolt to the plan represented by the passage of Measure 37, an
initiative that passed by a sixty-one percent margin,' 80demonstrates the
dangers of a land use planning scheme that suffers from problems in
169 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 442.
170 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 129. This pressure is necessarily focused
outward rather than inward to urban areas because urban areas are already developed.
171 See id.
172 Measure 37 is now codified at Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.352 (2005).
173 See, e.g., Ray Ring, Taking Liberties, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 24, 2006, at 9.
174 Id. at 12.
175 MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 311 (Or. 2006).
176 See Ring, supra note 173, at 13.
177 MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 312.
178 See Ring, supra note 173, at 12-13.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 12.
[Vol. 16:57
A MODERN DISASTER
implementation. For these reasons, Oregon's land use program should
inform the development of a comprehensive land use planning scheme,
but should be viewed as a building block rather than as a standard for
protecting agricultural land.
III. LAND USE REGULATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
"TAKINGS" CHALLENGES
Care must be taken in developing a comprehensive land use plan-
ning model to ensure that the model meets established legal standards.
When governments implement land use planning schemes, "they are in-
fluencing land values and the potential wealth of landowners." 181 Land
use planning tools, particularly non-voluntary land use planning tools
such as agricultural zoning schemes, frequently provoke legal challenges
because they have such an influence on the private sector. 8 2 The legal
implications of land use planning schemes, therefore, must be taken into
account when considering a comprehensive land use planning program.
The following discussion addresses the most important legal considera-
tion, the Fifth Amendment "takings" challenge, with particular emphasis
placed on this legal doctrine's application to non-voluntary agricultural
zoning schemes.
Zoning in general has long been recognized as an acceptable use of
governmental "police power" under the Tenth Amendment.8 3 The
United States Supreme Court first addressed the validity of zoning
schemes in the landmark case of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. 184 In
Euclid, the court held that zoning schemes are an acceptable use of po-
lice power if they are "asserted for the public welfare,"18 5 in other words,
"to achieve a clearly defined public purpose."' 8 6 Applied to agricultural
zoning, this constitutional test is met if the legislation enabling the zon-
ing scheme declares the protection of agricultural lands to be an impor-
tant public goal' 8 7 and the agricultural zoning scheme is implemented in
a manner consistent with the enabling legislation.' 88 In addition, it is
advisable for states to take the additional step of employing agricultural
181 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 107.
182 See Cordes, supra note 10, at 422.
183 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
184 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
185 Id. at 387.
186 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 107.
187 See id.; Cordes, supra note 10, at 425.
188 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 349.
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zoning pursuant to a "carefully drafted comprehensive plan,"'1 89 rather
than on an ad hoc basis.190
While these initial legal constraints must be considered by states
adopting agricultural zoning schemes, the "primary and most signifi-
cant"' 91 legal challenges to zoning schemes are Fifth Amendment tak-
ings challenges. 192 Takings challenges may also be based on state
constitutions, though Fifth Amendment challenges are more common. 1
93
These challenges are common "because of the significant economic im-
pact that agricultural zoning can have on land values as compared to
alternative uses."'194 In the "takings" area, a depressed property value is
almost invariably the result of an agricultural zoning scheme. Therefore,
states should take special precautions when drafting comprehensive land
use planning models that involve agricultural zoning schemes to ensure
compliance with the applicable legal standards, particularly those set
forth in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island. 195
The current doctrine, known as the "regulatory taking" doctrine,
first defined in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,196 "recognizes that in
very limited situations the economic impact of a land use regulation
might be so severe as to constitute an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty."' 197 When this occurs, the government may not apply the land use
regulation to the land at issue without compensating the landowner for
the taking. The tests for the takings doctrine are derived from two major
189 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 107. See also Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at
349 ("[M]ost states require that zoning be applied in accordance with a comprehensive plan.").
190 States should take particular care to adopt comprehensive land use plans because "land
use regulations which are administered arbitrarily and capriciously often instigate due process
attacks." Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 349. For an example of the application of the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard, see Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 10, 70 P.3d 47
("[M]unicipal land use decisions should be upheld unless those decisions are arbitrary and
capricious or otherwise illegal.").
191 Cordes, supra note 10, at 425.
192 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."
193 See, e.g., Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J. 1991) ("Al-
though [takings] standards bear the imprint of federal constitutional doctrine, our own state
constitutional principles governing the taking of property are in general conformity.").
194 Cordes, supra note 10, at 425-26.
195 533 U.S. 606, 625-629 (2001) (ruling that notice of a restriction when property is
acquired does not preclude a takings claim).
196 260 U.S. 393 (1992).
197 Cordes, supra note 10, at 426.
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Supreme Court cases: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council198 and
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. 199
A court may find a land use regulation to be an unconstitutional
taking of property under either of two separate tests. First, a land use
regulation may be an unconstitutional taking of property under Lucas if it
deprives a landowner of all economically viable use of the property-in
other words, if it is a complete taking.2° Second, a land use regulation
may amount to a taking even where it does not deprive the landowner of
all economically viable use of his property if the regulation meets the
Penn Central test.2 0  Under the Penn Central test, a court conducts a
multi-factored inquiry into the application of a land use regulation to a
parcel of property, focusing on "the character of the government action,
its economic impact, and the degree of interference with investment-
backed expectations. '' 20 2 Thus, the analysis applied to a takings claim
when a land use restriction is challenged is a two-step process: (1)
whether the regulation deprives the land of all economically viable use;
and (2) if not, whether the regulation still qualifies as a taking under the
Penn Central factors. Though the Supreme Court has never applied this
analysis to an agricultural zoning scheme, "a significant number of lower
courts have ... with the vast majority of cases holding that the restriction
was not a taking. '203 Lower courts have consistently held that agricul-
tural zoning is not a taking under the Lucas test where "the land is suita-
ble for agricultural use and is economically viable. '20 4 Lower courts
have also regularly held that agricultural zoning is not a taking under the
Penn Central test. 20 5 Most courts that have struck down an agricultural
198 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) (ruling that a regulation constitutes a taking if it de-
prives a landowner of all economic viability).
199 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1977) (stating that the extent of interference with the land user's
expectation of profit and reasonable return on investment is a significant factor in determining
whether a restriction is a taking).
200 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. The Court provided an exception to this rule: if the
regulation is preventing what would amount to a common law nuisance under state law, then
even loss of all economically viable use is not a taking. See id. at 1029-31. Thus, if an
agricultural zoning scheme were challenged as a taking, loss of all economically viable use of
the land would not amount to a taking if the landowner's use of the property constituted a
nuisance under state law.
201 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
202 Cordes, supra note 10, at 427.
203 Id. See also Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165 (9th
Cir. 1993) (applying federal takings doctrine to agricultural zoning scheme); Gardner v. N.J.
Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J. 1991) (same).
204 Cordes, supra note 10, at 427. See also Bell River Associates v. Charter Township of
China, 565 N.W. 2d 695, 700 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) ("[A] plaintiff who alleges that he was
denied economically viable use of his land must show that the property is either unsuitable for
use as zoned or unmarketable as zoned.") (citations and quotations omitted)).
205 See, e.g., Leonard v. Town of Brimfield, 666 N.E. 2d 1300, 1303 (Mass. 1996) (plain-
tiff could not have reasonable investment backed expectations in developing subdivision in
flood plain where land was already zoned to restrict such uses when plaintiff purchased it);
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zoning scheme have done so because the scheme was applied to land
unsuitable for farming.20 6
While Lucas and Penn Central provide the framework for takings
challenges, the Court's opinion in Palazzolo "has the potential of signifi-
cantly impacting regulatory takings analysis," including agricultural zon-
ing, because "the Court's analysis is applicable to a broad array of land
use restrictions. '20 7 Palazzolo involved a "wetlands regulation which
had been in place when the claimant acquired the property and had the
effect of prohibiting all development except the possible building of a
house on several uplands acres. '20 8 Prior to Palazzolo, lower federal
courts consistently held that landowners with notice of a land use restric-
tion at the time the property was purchased were precluded from main-
taining a takings claim. 20 9 However, the Court expanded its takings
jurisprudence in Palazzolo by holding that prior notice of a restriction
does not preclude a takings claim.210 The Court concluded that the plain-
tiff had not been deprived of all economically viable use of the property
under the Lucas test, but remanded the case for a determination of
whether the Penn Central test had been met.21  Thus, under Palazzolo a
landowner may establish that a taking has occurred under Penn Central
even if the land use restriction at issue was in effect at the time the land-
owner purchased the property and the regulation does not deprive the
landowner of all economically viable use of his property.
Although Palazzolo altered the regulatory takings landscape, this
change will likely not affect states that are administering their land use
planning schemes appropriately. Palazzolo affirmed the principle that
even minimal economic viability is enough to avoid a categorical taking
under Lucas.212 Thus, agriculturally zoned land meets the Lucas test as
Gardner, 593 A.2d at 261 (holding plaintiffs takings claim failed Penn Central test because
restriction did not interfere with plaintiffs investment-backed expectations).
206 See, e.g., Pettee v. County of Dekalb, 376 N.E. 2d 720, 725 (I11. App. Ct. 1978) (hold-
ing agricultural zoning restrictions resulted in taking because zoned property was unsuitable
for farming); Semja v. County of Boone, 339 N.E. 2d 452, 455 (I11. App. Ct. 1975) (same). An
overarching theme in takings jurisprudence, however, is that land use regulations do not
amount to a taking simply because they "involve [ ] substantial economic burden on the land-
owner." Cordes, supra note 10, at 429. See also Gardner, 593 A.2d at 259-260
("[I]mpairment of the marketability of land alone does not effect a taking .... [and] restric-
tions on uses do not necessarily result in takings although they reduce income or profits.")
(citations omitted).
207 Cordes, supra note 10, at 429.
208 Id.
209 See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding
that such notice negated investment based expectations); Leonard, 666 N.E. 2d at 1303 (hold-
ing that where plaintiff had purchased property subject to flood-plains restrictions, she could
not complain of right she never had).
210 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 625-29.
211 Id. at 629-30.
212 Id. at 630-31.
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long as the land to which the zoning scheme applies is actually suitable
for agricultural use, as lower federal courts have long held.21 3 Under
Palazzolo, any zoning scheme that is actually and suitably designed to
protect agricultural land should meet the Lucas test.
The open question in the aftermath of Palazzolo involves the appli-
cation of the Penn Central factors to land use regulations. While prior
notice of a land use restriction no longer precludes a takings claim, Jus-
tice O'Connor indicated in a concurring opinion that notice is a relevant
factor for courts to consider in addressing the third Penn Central factor,
which Penn Central labeled as the most important factor in the analy-
sis:214 the degree to which a land use restriction interferes with a land-
owner's reasonable investment backed expectations. 21 5 Therefore, a
landowner who purchases a parcel of property zoned for agricultural use
is still unlikely to mount a successful takings challenge under Penn Cen-
tral because his investment backed expectations will necessarily be set
by the zoning in place at the time of purchase. However, an agricultural
zoning scheme that is applied to land that was previously zoned for other
uses may be in danger. For example, if a state decided to apply an agri-
cultural zoning scheme to a large block of land that had been zoned for
commercial use, the landowners' investment backed expectations would
likely be diminished. Even in such a situation, however, the concept of
"regulatory risk" recognized in Lucas216 suggests that another of the
Penn Central factors, such as the character of the governmental action,
may be necessary for a court to hold that the Penn Central test has been
met.
To be safe, state and local governments should identify currently
productive agricultural land to which to apply agricultural zoning, rather
than attempt to convert land zoned for other uses to agricultural produc-
tion. In general, if an agricultural zoning scheme is implemented as part
of a comprehensive land use plan, is rationally based on accurate infor-
mation regarding the composition of a locality's lands, and is applied
systematically rather than in isolated instances, it is unlikely that a tak-
ings challenge to an agricultural zoning scheme will be successful under
Palazzolo. While takings claims will continue to be a legitimate concern
for state and local governments, properly conceived and implemented
comprehensive land use planning schemes would be upheld under cur-
rent takings jurisprudence.
213 See supra note 203-06 and accompanying text (discussing lower federal courts' appli-
cation of the Lucas test to agricultural zoning schemes).
214 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).
215 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626; id. at 638-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
216 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (1992) ("[Tihe property owner [must] necessarily expect[
the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time.").
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE
PLANNING MODEL
Land use planning is a complex and multi-faceted task. The wide-
spread development and conversion of productive agricultural land is the
result of many variables, each of which may be more or less influential in
any given state or locality. Land use planning to balance development
and agricultural land preservation will not be the same in every situation.
Even if the exact same scheme were implemented everywhere, the re-
sults would vary wildly; while conversion rates would decrease in some
localities, they would likely increase in others. Therefore, a properly
conceived land use planning model must be flexible enough to account
for differences among states and localities, yet capable of producing pre-
dictable and similar results. This can only be accomplished by incorpo-
rating various land use planning tools and allowing them to be adjusted
to suit the individual character and composition of each state. In this
manner, land use planning tools can be deployed in a complementary
fashion. The final goal of this Article is to suggest a comprehensive land
use planning model that incorporates a variety of land use planning tools
in this manner, thus creating a model that is capable of addressing agri-
cultural land conversion in any state or locality.
To begin with, a comprehensive land use planning model needs to
be comprehensive. As discussed in Part IV, states must be aware of the
legal implications of land use regulations, and ensure that land use plan-
ning meets established legal standards. 217 To accomplish this, states
need to draft enabling legislation indicating that the establishment and
maintenance of a proper balance between development and agricultural
land protection is an important state goal.2 18 In addition, states need to
ensure that the land use planning scheme is consistently implemented in
a manner that comports with this goal.219 Arbitrary variations from the
overarching goal run the risk of being challenged as inconsistent with the
state's goal. 220 Ad hoc applications of land use planning regulations to
individual parcels of property are at particular risk for legal challenge. 22'
In addition, if a land use planning scheme is not implemented properly,
there is a risk that opponents of the plan can mount an attack on the
217 See supra notes 181-216 and accompanying text (discussing legal restraints on land
use planning measures).
218 See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text (discussing need for state enabling
legislation).
219 See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text (discussing proper implementation of
land use planning regulations).
220 See supra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (highlighting the increased risk of




legislation through a voter initiative, as with Measure 37 in Oregon. 222
In short, states need to impose land use regulations as part of a well-
planned, strategic package-a comprehensive package in which each
land use planning tool is utilized in a manner consistent with the state's
goal.
A necessary prerequisite to establishing a comprehensive land use
planning model is an intensive information-gathering process to deter-
mine the character and composition of each state's lands. A land use
planning model cannot be applied comprehensively if states have insuffi-
cient information about their own physical makeup. 223 To this end, de-
tailed surveys and statistical analyses are needed. Initially, the federal
government should assist in the effort by updating the LESA information
gathering system and making it available to every state. The federal
LESA system needs to be reworked so that the value of agricultural land
is not discounted to account for increased developmental pressure. Be-
cause the majority of the productive agricultural land in America is lo-
cated on the urban fringe, developmental pressures are likely to be higher
on such land. By discounting for these pressures, the federal LESA sys-
tem ensures that the value of much of the prime agricultural land is artifi-
cially deflated, and thus deemed less worthy of protection. 224 Instead,
the federal LESA system should simply rate agricultural land based on
its productive value, and make this information available to states. If this
were done, states could better identify their most productive agricultural
land, regardless of location, and deploy their comprehensive land use
planning packages in a manner well suited to protect it.
Second, states must have access to comprehensive state-specific
land use information. For example, states would benefit from informa-
tion regarding existing land use, growth trends, developmental pressures,
and desired changes in land use. This is another area where the federal
government can assist in the effort. To date, the federal government has
enacted very limited legislation to assist in the protection of agricultural
land, providing funding for the implementation of a very narrow class of
voluntary land use planning tools. 225 The federal government can pro-
vide a greater benefit to states by using federal funds to assist states in
222 See supra note 172-79 and accompanying text.
223 Information gathering is not only a commonsense initial step to the adoption of a
comprehensive land use planning model, but is necessary to meet established legal standards.
If a land use planning regulation is imposed improperly on land that is not suited for the
restriction, the regulation runs a high risk of being struck down upon legal challenge. See
supra notes 204-16 and accompanying text (discussing necessity of imposing a land use regu-
lation only on land that is well-suited for the regulation).
224 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing federal LESA system).
225 See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing federal legislation to pro-
vide states with federal funds for PDR programs and conservation easements).
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establishing comprehensive land use planning models. The federal gov-
ernment could help accomplish this by providing funds, either alone or in
combination with state funds, to be used for statewide information gath-
ering processes. Information gathering should be organized from a top-
down, national level, and should be accomplished in a manner to ensure
that states are provided with truly accurate and helpful land use informa-
tion. The conversion of agricultural land on a state level is a problem
facing the nation as a whole, and Congress needs to address the problem
by enacting legislation that provides states with substantive support
rather than simply leaving land use planning to state and local govern-
ments. In the absence of federal assistance, states need to provide their
own funding to gather all-inclusive information regarding the composi-
tion and uses of their lands.
In addition to funding the information gathering process, the federal
government should take additional steps to ensure that its programs com-
plement comprehensive land use planning on a state level. The federal
government should also fund the development of a comprehensive land
use planning model that can be implemented in every state, identifying
key areas of federal involvement and which programs should be left to
state and local governments. The federal government would thereby en-
sure that its programs properly complement state land use planning regu-
lations. In addition, the development of such a model would align the
goals of federal and state governments. For example, the federal govern-
ment has enacted a variety of programs that fund, at least partially,
states' PDR and conservation easement programs.226 If the federal gov-
ernment developed a model for comprehensive land use planning, it
could enact legislation that builds on that model, rather than leaving
states to use federal programs arbitrarily. Moreover, the federal govern-
ment could then provide states with an incentive to adopt its model by
tying funding efforts to the model, as it has done with highway programs.
States adopting the comprehensive land use planning model would then
receive federal funding to assist with the implementation of various land
use planning tools.
At the very least, the federal government needs to give states an
incentive to adopt comprehensive land use planning models that curb
unplanned development. The federal government should adopt uniform
standards for land use planning that states must meet in order to receive
federal funding. Thus, federal funding-for example, for PDR pro-




meeting the minimum standards established by the federal govern-
ment.
227
These proposals necessarily suggest a large role for the federal gov-
ernment in land use planning. Major national land use planning initia-
tives have been proposed twice before, and both times have proven
unsuccessful. First, the USDA was reorganized during the New Deal in
a manner that allowed land use information to be fed to the USDA from
the bottom up-that is, from the county level. 228 Planning communities
were organized in each community to gather information on the compo-
sition of each locality by developing maps of existing land use. 229 "Once
existing land use was mapped, the local committees discussed desired
changes in land use and translated those changes onto a second county
map."'230 This information was then transmitted to the USDA, which
was to organize its actions in accordance with the land use plans of the
localities. 231 While this program seemed well-suited to harmonize local
and national interests, it proved too complex to manage due to the diffi-
culty inherent in "creat[ing] a coherent national policy simply by adding
up the wishes of individual counties. ' 232
Second, national land use planning reemerged during the 1960s and
1970s as "a response to rapid urban growth and the disappearance of
open space," the same motivating factors that are once again relevant at
the dawn of the twenty-first century. 233 Senator Henry Jackson proposed
the National Land Use Policy Bill, which contained "a simple program of
data collection and agency coordination" at the federal level. 234 Under
the program, "[t]he federal government would give states money to
gather data, classify land, and write a plan for coordinating state land use
decisions. Once each state had its affairs in order, federal agencies could
simply reference the states' plans and determine how federal investments
should be allocated. ' '235 The plan ultimately failed in large part due to
simple politics. President Nixon proposed a competing bill, eventually
combined with Jackson's bill, which contained an incentive scheme
whereby states would only receive federal funds if they exercised certain
227 The federal government came closest to doing this with FAIR, which provided federal
funding to states with dedicated farmland preservation programs. See supra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text.




232 Id. at 76.
233 Id. at 77.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 77-78.
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land use powers at the state rather than the local level.2 36 The joint bill
appeared before Congress several times, but was never passed.2 37
While the model suggested in this Article does propose a large role
for the federal government, it does not necessarily amount to national
land use planning.238 Rather, the proposed model calls for nationally
organized land use planning, with the federal government providing a
blueprint rather than a set of orders. The information gathering process
proposed here avoids the failures of the New Deal national land use plan-
ning proposals because it is structured as a pyramid rather than a siphon.
Instead of attempting to create a national land use policy by referencing
the sum total of community policies, the plan proposed here calls for a
nationally organized information gathering process to provide localities
with information necessary to implement responsible land use planning
decisions. It also avoids the failures of the national land use planning
initiatives of the 1970s because it does more than simply reference
states' land use plans in determining proper federal expenditures. In-
stead, the model proposed here calls for a coherent national land use
planning policy with the goal of preserving valuable and productive agri-
cultural land while allowing development to proceed in an intelligent and
.organized fashion. In furtherance of this goal, a land use planning model
can be developed by the federal government and provided for states to
implement. States could then implement the land use planning model in
a manner best suited to their particular needs, identified in the first step
of nationally organized information gathering. In addition, by organizing
land use planning on a national level, the federal government would be
better equipped to implement federal programs in a manner complemen-
tary to state land use planning schemes. It could also ensure that a wide
variety of federal legislation, such as highway funding and home mort-
gage programs, would be implemented consistently with land use policy.
While the federal government certainly has a large and important
role to play in land use planning, most land use planning tools are prop-
erly implemented on a state and local level. Thus, the remainder of this
Section discusses the manner in which a variety of land use planning
tools can be effectively deployed in a complementary manner by state
236 Id. at 78.
237 Id.
238 Nor is this Article the only modem proposal for federal land use planning. For exam-
ple, Bruce Babbitt, former Secretary of the Interior in the Clinton administration, recently
published a volume advocating for national land use planning. BRUCE BABBITT, CITIES IN THE
WILDERNESS: A NEW VISION OF LAND USE IN AMERICA (Island Press 2005). According to Mr.
Babbitt, "[t]he notion that land use is a local matter has come to dominate the political rhetoric
of our age," though this notion is outdated. Id. at 5. For another recent publication addressing
national land use planning, see ROGER C. KENNEDY, WILDFIRE AND AMERICANS: How To
SAVE LIvEs, PROPERTY, AND YOUR TAX DOLLARS (Hill & Wang 2006).
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and local governments as part of a comprehensive land use planning
model. However, essential to this suggested model is sufficient funding,
coordination, and planning development by the federal government. Be-
cause the manner in which a comprehensive land use planning program
operates will obviously be different in each locality, the following
merely outlines, in broad strokes, suggestions for how various land use
planning tools can be utilized as part of a comprehensive model.
To begin with, a carefully planned statewide zoning strategy should
be the backbone of any land use planning program. The purpose of the
initial information gathering step is to clearly identify the location of
various categories of land. Once this is accomplished, states can apply a
zoning scheme to classify these categories and define the uses which are
allowed in each category. Agricultural zoning should be deployed to the
furthest extent allowable under the law because it is such an effective
method of preserving productive agricultural land. 239 States should ap-
ply exclusive agricultural zoning schemes to all large blocks of readily
identifiable agricultural land. Exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are
the least expensive way for states to preserve large areas of productive
agricultural land, and are very effective at preventing suburban sprawl
from gradually diminishing the productivity of the area. 240 In addition,
states can generally avoid legal challenges by limiting the application of
exclusive agricultural zoning schemes to large blocks of land that are
currently well-suited to agricultural production and where market pres-
sures have not yet begun to mount.241 This type of agricultural zoning
has proven effective in Oregon, and other states should follow its lead. 242
In addition to exclusive agricultural zoning, states should apply non-
exclusive agricultural zoning schemes to smaller blocks of productive
agricultural land that are currently well-suited for agricultural use. 243
Because of the flexibility that non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes
offer, they are more likely to be effective at balancing competing inter-
ests in smaller areas of agricultural land, which are more likely to be
239 See supra notes 104-135 and accompanying text (discussing types of agricultural zon-
ing and their corresponding benefits).
240 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing exclusive agricultural zon-
ing schemes).
241 Id.
242 See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (discussing Oregon's use of EFU
zones).
243 This is not to suggest that all land which is capable of agricultural production should
be designated for agricultural use. In surveying the composition of their land, states will no
doubt identify agriculturally productive land that is, for example, broken up into small parcels,
located in between an urban or suburban area and larger blocks of agricultural land, and cur-
rently subject to intense market pressure to develop. It would not be inappropriate for states to
set such areas of land aside as future growth zones or buffer zones.
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subject to market pressures. 244 Within these areas, state and local gov-
ernments should implement their non-exclusive agricultural zoning
schemes in a variety of ways, depending on the particular needs of the
locality. 245 Where feasible, the government should set the largest mini-
mum lot size possible for these areas to prevent the manipulation of the
agricultural zoning scheme to create agricultural estates and hobby
farms. For example, if the smallest parcel of land in a certain block of
agricultural land is twenty acres, the minimum lot size should be set at
twenty acres.
Where agricultural land has already been divided into smaller par-
cels, sliding-scale zones should be used, with the highest possible barrier
to development imposed on the land. For example, if agricultural land in
a given area is broken down into parcels averaging between ten and
eighty acres, the locality should begin the sliding-scale zone at ten acres
to prevent the parcels from being divided into smaller pieces. In addi-
tion, state and local governments should employ buffer zones and UGBs
to set agricultural land apart from urban and suburban development, but
carefully monitor their progress to ensure that problems such as those
occurring in Oregon do not surface.246 Cluster zoning should be im-
posed only when clearly necessary, because cluster zoning allows small
portions of agricultural land to be developed intensively. This practice
frequently creates subdivisions in the corner of larger agricultural units
that then exert developmental pressure on the rest of the land.247 How-
ever, cluster zoning is effective at preserving a large piece of productive
agricultural land, and should be utilized if the continued viability of the
agricultural portion of the parcel can be guaranteed. If cluster zoning
cannot be utilized in this manner, state and local governments can imple-
ment fixed area allocations, imposing the largest possible minimum lot
size. Wherever possible, state and local governments should establish
UGBs between all land zoned for agricultural use and land zoned for
other uses, to force growth inward rather than outward. When this is not
feasible due to established development, traditional buffer zones should
be employed, again with the largest minimum lot size possible.
State governments should also adopt programs to benefit agricul-
tural land located within their agricultural zones. Tax incentive pro-
grams are a necessity to prevent the value of agricultural land being
driven up as development begins to encroach on the agricultural bound-
244 See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing non-exclusive agricultural
zoning schemes).
245 Id.
246 See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (discussing buffer zones and UGBs);
See also supra notes 166-71 (discussing the problems associated with UGBs and buffer zones
in Oregon).
247 See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (discussing cluster zoning)
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ary and exert market pressures. 248 In addition, state governments should
draft their tax incentive legislation very strictly to prevent developers
from taking advantage of favorable tax schemes while preparing land for
subdivision and development. 249 This is particularly important in buffer
zones and non-exclusive agricultural zones employing sliding-scale or
cluster zoning methods, where more development opportunities exist. In
addition, state governments should ensure that right-to-farm laws are in
place to protect agricultural landowners from litigation.250 These laws
are particularly necessary in buffer zones and non-exclusive agricultural
zones employing sliding-scale or cluster zoning methods, where produc-
tive agricultural land is located in closer proximity to residential areas or
other development.
Although agricultural zoning is a necessary component of any com-
prehensive land use planning model, zoning alone is an insufficient
means of adequately defusing market pressures that naturally build up.25'
As applied to agricultural land that directly abuts urban or suburban de-
velopment, agricultural zoning may not be an effective land use planning
tool. There may be extensive development interspersed with agricultural
land in such areas, making application of an agricultural zoning scheme
less feasible. This is a particularly important area of focus for state and
local governments enacting comprehensive land use planning schemes
because much of the productive agricultural land in America is located
near urban areas.
While agricultural zoning should be utilized to some extent, other
voluntary land use planning tools may be more effective in preserving
agricultural land in such situations. 252 States should encourage owners
of agricultural land to donate conservation easements. Conservation
easements are effective in preserving agricultural production, and do not
entail a heavy financial burden on state and local governments. 253 States
can encourage the donation of conservation easements through incentive
programs, such as favorable tax schemes and deductions. In addition,
states should employ PDR and TDR programs to secure development
rights on productive agricultural land. While these programs are the
248 See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussing tax incentive programs).
249 See id. (discussing potential problems with tax incentive programs).
250 See supra notes 102-03 (discussing right-to-farm laws).
251 See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of agricultural
zoning schemes).
252 See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary PDR, TDR, and
conservation easement programs).
253 See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing conservation easement
programs).
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most expensive land use planning tools, they are extremely effective in
preserving productive agricultural land.25 4
States should take advantage of federal funding for these programs
to the fullest extent possible, and carefully apply the funds to land which
other land use planning tools are unlikely to preserve. The federal gov-
ernment can assist in states' efforts by increasing funding for these pro-
grams and monitoring states' use of the funds to ensure that federal
programs are having the maximum impact. States should also use state
funds to implement these-programs, strategically employing these pro-
grams to purchase development rights to more endangered agricultural
land. Finally, governments at both the federal and state level should co-
ordinate their land use planning efforts with those of private organiza-
tions such as land trusts. Such organizations frequently use private funds
to purchase development rights to agricultural land, and to date, have
done so outside of any organized governmental framework. 255 By co-
opting the efforts of such organizations, governments can maximize the
impact of private funds and ensure that private efforts complement the
comprehensive land use plan.
In summary, land use planning tools cannot be deployed in isola-
tion, for they are only truly effective when implemented in a complemen-
tary fashion as part of a comprehensive land use planning package. Each
level of government has a role in promoting intelligent land use planning.
The federal government can provide individual states with structure and
funding to implement their land use planning schemes. State govern-
ments are suitable instruments for implementing comprehensive land use
planning, but must be given incentives to contribute to a broad national
goal. While state governments should be encouraged to adopt compre-
hensive land use planning strategies, land use planning tools must be
implemented on a local level, with state governments providing the nec-
essary oversight. Each piece of the puzzle must be complementary: the
federal government must ensure that its legislation complements state
and local programs, and state governments must ensure that each land
use planning tool is deployed in a complementary fashion. This is ac-
complished through the adoption of a comprehensive land use planning
model that is capable of adequately balancing market pressures that favor
development with the need to preserve valuable agricultural land.
CONCLUSION
Productive agricultural land is being developed and converted to
suburban sprawl in every state in America at increasing rates. America
254 See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary PDR, TDR, and
conservation easement programs).
255 See Wildermuth, supra note 45, at 146-49.
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cannot afford to postpone formulating a solution to this problem. A pro-
gram capable of reversing the trend needs to be developed and imple-
mented now. To date, no thoroughly comprehensive plan exists to effect
the necessary change. While the federal government and state and local
governments have recently begun to address this problem, their respec-
tive efforts are not coordinated and have not been successful. A compre-
hensive land use planning model capable of responding to the many
variables inherent in land use planning is necessary. This Article repre-
sents an attempt to lay the groundwork necessary for such a model.
Thus, it suggests a framework for the development of a comprehensive
land use planning strategy, a strategy that is flexible enough to adapt to
the different composition of each state. This model involves both the
federal government and state and local governments, and attempts to co-
ordinate their respective capacities in a complementary manner. It also
provides an example of the manner in which a variety of land use plan-
ning tools may be deployed in a complementary fashion. By employing
a wide variety of land use planning tools, this model allows each individ-
ual land use planning tool to play to its own strengths while also account-
ing for other tools' weaknesses. In addition, this model considers the
legal framework in which land use planning schemes operate, and should
survive legal challenge if properly implemented. By taking all of these
factors into consideration, this Article lays the foundation for a compre-
hensive land use planning model capable of adequately balancing the
competing interests between development and agricultural land preserva-
tion. The development of such a model would prevent America's pro-
ductive agricultural land from being developed in a haphazard fashion
while allowing necessary development to occur in an intelligent, organ-
ized manner.
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